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NOTE AND COMMENT
It conversely appears that the standards for admission might be
raised, also to the benefit of the public interest.
Those members who find themselves unable to cope with the
other members of the profession must find an outlet for their
activities in other spheres of endeavor, thus leaving for the serv-
ice of the public only those who are best qualified and best
fitted to render legal service.
Your president will attend the conference of State Bar As-
sociation Presidents in Chicago the latter part of February. This
is an innovation of the American Bar Association, and President
Gallagher hopes for great things from this conference.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MISCEGENETIC MARRIAGES
In October of 1948 the Supreme Court of California handed
down a decision that may have far reaching results. The deci-
sion was contrary to an unbroken line of precedents and may
be the forerunner of a more realistic and objective approach to
one of America's great problems, the status of the negro.
The Court in Perez v. Lippold' held unconstitutional the
state statute forbidding miscegenetic marriages. Although about
30 states,' including Montana, have similar statutes, California
is the first to invalidate such legislation by judicial process.' In
'Perez v. Lippold, (1948) ...... Calif ....... , 198 P.(2d) 17.
'RADiN, THE LAW AND YOU, p. 48, cites Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming.
'R.C.M. 1947, §48-106 (5700).
Every marriage hereafter contracted or solemnized between a
white person and a negro, or a person of negro blood or in part
negro, shall be utterly null and void.
R.C.M. 1947, §48-107 (5701).
Every marriage hereafter contracted or solemnized between a
white person and a Chinese person shall be utterly null and void.
R.C.M. 1947, §48-108 (570'2).
Every marriage hereafter contracted or solemnized between a
white person and a Japanese person shall be utterly null and void.
The text of this article is confined largely to a discussion of the Negro-
White miscegenation, but it is thought that research will show the ef-
fect of Asiatic-Caucasian mixture to be similar biologically and so-
ciologically.
'Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Oregon, Tennessee
and Texas hold miscegenation statutes valid. Montana and Virginia
cases have relied on miscegenation statutes, but the question of con-
stitutionality has not been raised in the latter two states.
Cases upholding the miscegenation statutes:
Green v. State (1877) 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. Rep. 739.
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eight states the will of the electorate has led to the repeal of
this discriminatory regulation.
The California statute, Section 60 of the Civil Code reads,
"All marriages of white persons with negroes, Mon-
golians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes are il-
legal and void."
This statute was attacked as a denial of freedom of religion,' due
process of law, and equal protection of the laws to the petition-
ers, a mixed couple wishing to be married.
The due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee
to an individual that his freedom of action will not be hampered
except for a legitimate public interest and in a reasonable man-
ner.' They require that states shall make no unreasonable or
arbitrary classifications in devising their systems of regulatory
legislation' and that classifications be in the furtherance of some
legitimate public interest.'
In determining the reasonableness of the regulation the
Kirby v. State (1922) 24 Ariz. 9, 206 P. 405.
State v. Pass (1942) 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.(2d) 882.
Dodson v. State (1895) 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977.
Jackson v. Denver (1942) 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.(2d) 240.
State v. Gibson, (1871) 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42.
In re Paquet's Estate (1921) 101 Ore. 393, 200 P. 911.
Doc. Lonas v. State (1871) 50 Tenn. 287.
Frasher v. State (1877) 3 Tex. App. 263, 30 Am. Rep. 131.
The Montana and Virginia citations are:
In re Takahashi's Estate (1942) 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.(2d) 217.
Kinney v. Commonwealth (1878) 30 Grat. 858, 71 Va. 284, 32 Am.
Rep. 690.
sMassachusetts 1843, Kansas 1859, New Mexico 1866, Washington 1868,
Rhode Island 1881, Minnesota 1883, Michigan 1883, Ohio 1887.
'it seems doubtful if freedom of religion is a proper justification for
this decision. Apparently there were no allegations that the Catholic
church viewed favorably miscegenous marriages. In other freedom of
religion cases there has been a positive stand by the religious organ-
ization of which the petitioner was a member on the controverted point.
This does not appear in the Perez case.
The dissent points out that if the petitioners' church did have
any view on the point, it was not favorable.1Bettey v. City of Sidney (1927) 79 M. 314, 257 P. 1007, 56 A.L.R. 872;
State v. Gateway Mortuaries, (1930) 87 M. 225, 287 P. 156, 68 A.L.R.
1512; Plessey v. Ferguson (1896) 163 U.S. 537, 41 L.Ed. 256, 16 S.Ct.
1138; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. (1934) 294 U.S. 405, 79 L.Ed. 949,
55 S.Ct. 486.
'RoTrscHAFFEa, CoiqsTrroIAL LAW (1939) §239, p. 454.
'American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, (1900), 179 U.S. 89, 45
L.Ed. 102, 12 S.Ct. 43.
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court should compare the extent of the interference with the in-
dividual with the extent of the public interest."
Generalizations have been made by the courts denouncing
mixed marriages as "unnatural," "productive of deplorable re-
sults, " 'conducive to a degeneration of the public morals," and
detrimental to the "moral and physical development of both
races and the highest advancement of civilization. "" One would
expect that such dogmatic statements would be backed by a mass
of uncontroverted evidence, but a great many contemporary
authorities assert views contrary to such statements, an examina-
tion of which follows.
BIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF RACE MIXTURE
John Gillin, Professor of Anthropology, University of North
Carolina, in his anthropology text asked,"
"What is the genetic effect of outbreeding, this much
maligned process which in humans is so often stigmatized
as miscegenation, race mixture, and 'tainting the purity
of the blood'?"
His answer was,
"On genetic principles the expected results of out
breeding may be summarized as follows . . . so far as
physical form and function can be observed, this new
heterozygosity will usually result in a phenomenon known
as hybrid vigor or heterosis. The offspring of the cross
will tend to be larger in size, more active, more fertile,
and with improved vitality and longevity."
Earl Finch in 1924 commented in his article on the effects
of racial miscegenation :"
"Thomas Reed Powell, Alien Land Cases in the United States Supreme
Court, 12 CALIF. L. Ruv. 259, 278, (1924).
"Scott v. Georgia, (1869) 39 Ga. 321; Eggers v. Olson (1924) 104 Okla.
279, 231 P. 483, 486; 18 R.C.L. §31, p. 409.
"GOLIN, THE WAYS OF MEN, (1st Ed., 1941).
'Earl Finch, The Effects of Racial Miscegenation, p. 215 of SouRcEnoOK
ON ANTHROPOLOGY by A. L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman.
The respondent in the Perez case "contends that Negroes and im-
pliedly the other races specified ..... are inferior mentally to Cau-
casians." This is an exposition of the Race Superiority theory that
flourished in Europe in the nineteenth century. Count Arthur de
Gobineau, a French diplomat, formulated the theory which stated that
the white race alone in history has shown itself capable of fostering
civilization.
Gobineau's philosophy was not well received in France and he
went to Germany and acquired quite a following. Gobineau clubs were
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" The superiority of the mixed people to the native
stock in fertility and vitality is shown by their persistence,
sometimes in the very locality in which the native race, in
contact with foreigners, has declined or disappeared.
While race blending is not everywhere desirable, yet
the crossing of distinct races, especially when it occurs
with social sanction, often produces a superior type; cer-
tainly such crossing as has occurred tends to prove absurd
the conclusion that the dilution of the blood of the so-
called higher races by that of the so-called lower races
will either set the species on the highway to extinction, or
cause a relapse to barbarism. "
Ruth Benedict in her book on the interrelationship of race,
science and politics stated,'
"Modern instances of the evils of racial mixture do
not, however, prove that intermixture is a biologic evil.
In the first place, history has shown that such mixed races
have flourished and progressed even in those extreme
cases where intermixture has been across the color line.
Even in some parts of the modern world mixture of
races shows no evil effects. Students have always pointed
this out for Hawaii, where the code of racial separatism
has been conspicuously lacking. . . . At the Governor's
receptions and university dances there is no color line.
Cultural development of Hawaii has not suffered."
Specific instances of the demonstration of the biological ad-
vantages of miscegenetic marriages include the Hottentot-White
started all over that country. One of his successors, an Englishman
named Houston Stewart Chamberlain, was coolly received in England
and he too went to Germany for audience where the Kaiser was so
well pleased with the race superiority doctrine that he made Chamber-
lain his court anthropologist.
In the United States the leading proponent was Madison Grant
who wrote a book on the subject, "THE PASSING OF A GREAT RACE."
(1st Ed., 1916).
The people of Germany and the United States seemed more recep-
tive to the doctrine than other Caucasian groups. Modern investiga-
tion and analysis has shown that there is no one race, not even Hitler's
Nordic clan, that is superior, or that cannot be benefitted by acquir-
ing some of the characteristics of another race.
During the first World War intelligence tests were given to the
American Expeditionary Forces and the enormous number of in-
dividuals from all over the country made this an ideal sampling. Bene-
dict, inira, note 14, summarized the results. Southern whites scored
lower than Northern negros but the average white score was above the
average negro score. Benedict attributes this to the fact that the
negroes are massed in the South where per capita expenditures for
education are low and the standard of living is low.
"'BENEDICT, RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITIcs, (1st Ed., 1940).
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mixture known as the Rehoboth Bastards of South Africa. This
mixture occurred between Boer descendents and Hottentot
women. A study of this group was published in 1913 by the
German anthropologist, Eugene Fischer. The report stated that
the hybrids were on the average taller than either the Hotten-
tots or Europeans. The mixed bloods were extremely fertile
with an average offspring of 7.4 per woman and they showed
no defects in health or constitution.
Oliver LaFarge's symposium' includes an article by Harry
L. Shapiro, the Curator of Physical Anthropology of the
American Museum of Natural History, in which the eminent
anthropologist quotes figures obtained from the 1910 census deal-
ing with full blood and hybrid American Indians. He states that
in full blood Indians 10.7% were sterile and in breeds only 6.7%.
In full blood families, there was an average of 4.5 children per
family and. in families of hybrid parents the average was 5.1.
Benedict, Finch and Gillin all mention the unusual in-
cident of the mutineers of the "Bounty" in their works. Finch& '
has this to say about it,
"Pitcairn Island was settled in 1790 by nine English
mutineers, six Tahitian men, and 15 Tahitian women. In
1808 only white men and eight or nine women and chil-
dren were left. But the first half breeds grew up, inter-
married, and had numerous children. In 1855 the popula-
tion had increased to 200. After removing to Norfolk
Island in 1856 they increased so rapidly that, although 16
returned to Pitcairn Island in 1859, they numbered 300 in
1868; in 1905 the population of Norfolk Island was 1059,
a majority of whom were descendants of the mutineers.
The present population of Pitcairn Island is flourishing."
Gillin also cites several other examples of mixtures that have
shown improvements over the parent stock, specifically the
White-Negro mixture in Brazil, and the Indonesian-White mix-
ture on the Timor Archipelago.
With relation to the effect of race mixture on the mental
ability of the offspring, M. J. Herskovits in his study," indi-
cates that when mulattoes were classified scientifically as to the
percentage of Negro blood, the intelligence tests given them
showed the correlation between their intelligence and the per-
centage of Negro blood to be insignificant.
'LAFAwRm, THE CHANGING AMERICAN INDIAN, (1st Ed., 1943).
'"Supra, note 13.
"7HERSKOVITS, ON THE RELATION BETWEEN NEGRO-WHITE MIXTURE AND
STANDING ON INTELLIGENCE TESTS, (1st Ed., 1928).
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SOCIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF RACE MIXTURE
Julian Huxley stated in 19368 that,
If the alleged inferiority of the half-castes really
exists, it is much more likely to be the product of the
unfavorable social atmosphere in which they grow up than
due to any effect, which would be biologically very un-
usual, of their mixed heredity.
What then are the results of mixed marriages from the
sociological point of view?
The respondent in the Perez case suggests that a mixed
marriage might foster race tension that could culminate in vio-
lence. Idealistically19 it could be argued, as suggested by the
majority of the court, that the abolishment of some of the legally
perpetrated discriminations might be of greater ultimate aid in
easing the tensions than giving legislative and judicial sanction
to a continuation of such laws as call attention to racial animosi-
ties. In any event, the danger of violence occurring due to the
fact of a mixed marriage is probably exaggerated. The number
of mulattoes gives an accurate indication of the extent of mis-
cegenetic relations in this country. Were such relations con-
ducive to violence in any appreciable extent, the country would
be plagued with race riots continuously.
The dissent in the Perez case states that one purpose of this
legislation is the preservation of the race. It seems doubtful if
there is any public interest in preserving the race in view of
the history and philosophy of government of the United States.
The native population of North America is the American Indian.
The rest of us descended from immigrants. Little "public inter-
est" can exist in preserving the race in a country where the
native "race" has been relegated to reservations and the
usurpers are a conglomerate of every race, nationality and
creed existent on this planet.
Traditionally the United States has extended invitations to
all people to come and find a haven of justice and security. Only
when the economy of the nation could not stand the influx were
particular races excluded.' No exclusion ever occurred merely
because some race was not desirable to the conglomerate There
'sJulian Huxley, Eugenics and Society, GALToN LIcrunE, Eugenics So-
ciety, London (1936).
'
9From the practical standpoint it might be impossible to secure the
passage of desirable legislation, but invalidating this undesirable leg-
islation by judicial process is a step in the right direction.
'
8The Chinese Exclusion, 8 U.S.C.A. 261, 8 F.C.A. 136.
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can be no basis for preserving the race under these circum-
stances.
The respondent in the Perez case advanced the suggestion
that mixed unions might result in ostracism of the couple. It
might also place an insuperable obstacle in the path of a suc-
cessful, lasting union. Certainly these factors are to be con-
sidered by the principals of such a marriage. The state too has
an interest in preserving the marriages of its citizens but the
state is limited in the extent to which it can interfere with the
civil rights of individuals.
The individual's interest, the right to equality and thereby
his right to select the mate of his own choice, is of vital concern
to him. To deny him that right could be to deprive him of the
most important asset and enjoyment of his life. Compare this
fo the public's interest in preserving the peace, and preventing
social ostracism of the couple. The result weighs heavily in fa-
vor of the individual's interest.
Normally where a classification is attempted by a legislative
body the presumption is in favor of the validity of the classi-
fication. When the classification is based solely on race, how-
ever, this presumption is dissipated. Several cases in the
Supreme Court of the United States have held that a classifica-
tion based solely on race is unconstitutional.' Probably a better
rule was laid down in Korematsu v. United States.' Mr. Justice
Black speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States
stated,
... all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect. ...
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the ex-
istence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."
Mr. Justice Carter in his concurring opinion in the Perez
case comments on Justice Black's remarks,
"That suspicion which attaches to cases involving dis-
crimination is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
validity and constitutionality normally present when a
statute is attacked as unconstitutional."
It is submitted that the real reason for these discriminatory
'Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1868) 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220;
Hill v. Texas (1941) 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559.
'Korematsu v. United States (1944) 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194,
89 L.Ed. 194, 199.
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statutes is race prejudice. The "Land of Liberty" is perpetrat-
ing a caste system by law. We cannot make colored people so-
cially equal by court decree, but as individuals and citizens they
deserve equality in law, in accordance with the intentions of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.
STUART W. CONNER.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-NECESSITY OF
JUDGMENT TO SET ASIDE
I.
Section 29-209 (8605), Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, de-
clares that "a creditor can avoid the act or obligation of his
debtor for fraud only where the fraud obstructs the enforcement,
by legal process, of his right to property affected by the trans-
fer or obligation." Interpretation of this statute has given rise
to the rule that in an action to set aside a conveyance by an in-
solvent on grounds of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud cred-
itors, the complaint must allege that the creditor has established
a lien upon the property sought to be transferred, either by at-
tachment or by judgment with a return nulla bona.' Several
Montana decisions have adhered to this rule without specific
reference to the statutory provision.
In 1945 Montana adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act.! The question is posed: Does Section 29-209 (8605)
conflict with sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Act?' More
specifically, how, if at all, has the adoption of the Act changed
the preliminary conditions governing the remedy in equity?
Thus far there has been no interpretation by the Supreme Court
of Montana of the provisions pertinent to this article. The Act
does not explicitly state that a judgment with a return unsatis-
fied is no longer essential to maintaining a suit in equity to
annul a fraudulent conveyance. Certainty would have been
promoted if such were the case. However, the Act appears to
imply that a creditor can avoid a conveyance fraudulent as to
'Ferrell v. Elling (1929) 84 Mont. 384, 276 P. 432; First Natl. Bank v.
Conner (1929) 85 Mont. 229, 278 P. 143.
'Northern Mont. State Bank v. Collins et al (1923) 67 Mont. 575, 216
P. 330; Missoula Trust and Saving Bank v. Boos (1938) 106 Mont. 294,
77 P. 385; Edenfield v. C. V. Seal Co., Inc., et al (1928) 83 Mont. 49,
270 P. 642; Stone-Ordean Wells Co. v. Strong et al (1933) 94 Mont. 20,
20 P.(2d) 639.
'R.C.M. 1947, §§29-101 to 29-113.
'R.C.M. 1947, §§29-109, 29-110.
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